Skip to content

Guide

What a Buyer Should Test About a Target's Commercial Team

Pre-close tests on a target's commercial team: who originates revenue rather than who holds the title, and what the incentive plan actually pays for.

Commercial team diligence is the pre-close work of establishing who in a target actually produces revenue, as distinct from who holds the commercial titles. It is a different exercise from management assessment, which asks whether the people are good, and from pipeline data diligence, which asks whether the numbers are real. The question here is narrower and more useful to a buyer: if the deal model assumes growth, which named individuals does that growth currently run through, how much of the base would move if any of them left, and what would the platform have to build to make the answer different.

Most deal teams cover this with an org chart, a tenure table and two hours of management interviews. That produces a view of the function’s shape and almost nothing about its dependencies. The tests below produce facts, and they can all be run from material a target will hand over in a normal process.

The org chart tells you the shape, not the source

Titles in a mid-market target are a poor guide to revenue production. A VP of Sales may be running a reporting layer over three producers who each originated their own book before the title existed. A branch manager with no commercial title may be the reason four of the top ten accounts renew. A founder who has formally stepped back may still be the person every large customer calls first.

None of that shows up in the structure chart, and it rarely comes up in management meetings, because the people in the room have an interest in presenting a functioning system rather than a set of personal relationships. The seller is not usually lying. They are describing the company as they have organized it, which is not the same as describing how revenue arrives.

The practical consequence for a buyer is that key-person risk gets located in the wrong place. It gets attached to the people with the senior titles, who are often the most replaceable, and missed on the people who hold the relationships, who are often not.

Reconstruct origination, not closing credit

The CRM will tell you who closed a deal. That field exists because it drives commission. There is almost never a field for who brought the opportunity in the first place, and that is the field that matters.

Take the top accounts by trailing revenue, enough of them to cover a clear majority of the base, and trace each one back to its first contact. For each, establish how the company came to be talking to that customer at all: an existing personal relationship, an inbound inquiry, a referral from another customer, a channel or partner introduction, an outbound campaign, or an acquisition that brought the account with it. Then establish who did the work of converting it.

Those two answers are frequently different people, and the gap is informative in both directions. A book where origination is spread across a marketing system, a referral base and a partner channel is a book the platform can keep and grow, whatever happens to individual reps. A book where origination traces repeatedly to the same one or two names is a book that depends on those people continuing to want to work there, no matter how institutional the closing process looks.

This is reconstruction work rather than a report you can request, and it is worth doing by hand on a sample rather than approximately on everything. Ten accounts traced properly will tell you more than a spreadsheet of two hundred with a column you cannot verify. If the target’s pipeline data is itself unreliable, that is a separate finding with its own tests, covered in CRM and pipeline data diligence.

Measure the revenue one person can move, not the revenue they are paid for

Rep concentration is usually calculated from bookings credit, because that is the number the system produces. It understates the exposure, often by a wide margin.

Calculate it twice. The first number is the share of revenue a person is credited with. The second is the share of revenue where that person is the relationship the customer actually has, whether or not they are credited and whether or not they sit in sales. The second number is the one that describes what could leave, and in services businesses it is commonly much larger than the first.

The gap between the two numbers is the thing to interrogate. A large gap usually means the company has built a commission system on top of a relationship business without changing the relationship business underneath. That is not automatically a problem, but it means the retention risk and the incentive design are pointed at different people, and it tends to surface the first time the platform tries to redistribute accounts.

Resist the temptation to settle this with a threshold borrowed from somewhere else. What matters is not whether one person sits above some percentage, but whether the business has any mechanism other than that person for the revenue they hold to continue.

Find out who the customer calls when the work goes wrong

Buyers test the selling relationship and skip the service relationship, which in a services or multi-site business is usually the durable one.

The question is simple and the answer is gettable in diligence. When a job is late, a crew does not turn up, an invoice is wrong or a specification changes, who does the customer contact, and is that person in the commercial function at all? In many targets it is an operations lead, a branch manager, a scheduler or a long-tenured account coordinator. That person may have no quota, no commission and no title that would place them in a commercial review, and may still be the reason the account is still here.

Two findings come out of this. The first is a corrected map of who must be retained, which is frequently not the list the seller would produce. The second is a read on whether the company has institutional service coverage or personal service coverage, which bears directly on whether the platform can integrate this business without the customers noticing. The post-close version of that decision, including how to resolve overlapping ownership between two books, is a separate exercise covered in integrating an acquired sales team.

Read the incentive plan, then read what it actually paid

Ask for the comp plan documents and the last two years of actual payouts by person, and read them against each other. The gap between the two is where the real incentive sits.

Specific things worth establishing: what the plan commissions, whether bookings, recognized revenue or cash collected, because those three reward different behavior at quarter end. Whether renewals and existing-account revenue pay at the same rate as new business, which tells you what the team has been paid to do rather than what management says it does. Whether there are accelerators that make a small number of large deals disproportionately valuable to a rep, and whether the deals in the current pipeline look shaped by that. Whether anything in the plan pays for the specific growth the deal model assumes, such as a new service line, a new geography or a cross-sell, and if not, what the platform would have to change and what that change costs.

Payouts that consistently cluster just above the threshold where accelerators begin, or quarters where bookings arrive in a narrow window at the end, are worth a question. Neither is proof of anything on its own. Both are signals about how the number gets made.

Decide what the finding is evidence of before taking it anywhere

Commercial team findings are weaker as price arguments than buyers expect them to be. A seller will characterize almost any people finding as a retention matter, and retention has a familiar set of answers, such as stay packages, earnouts and employment agreements, which a seller will offer rather than accept a discount. Pushing a dependency finding as a valuation argument usually ends in structure rather than price, and often ends in nothing.

The finding is almost always worth more as a plan input. If origination concentrates in two people, the platform’s first year has to include building a demand source that does not depend on them, and that has a cost and a lead time that belong in the budget and the first-hundred-days plan rather than in the model. If the service relationship sits with operations, the integration sequence has to protect those people before it touches anything customer-facing. If the comp plan pays for nothing the thesis requires, the plan change is a day-one item with a known cost.

The exception is narrow and worth stating. When origination traces almost entirely to one person, that person is leaving at close, and nothing in the base renews without them, the growth case is not a plan problem. It is an assumption that has failed, and the number it supports should change. A related distinction, applied to capacity rather than people, is drawn in delivery capacity diligence.

What this does not settle

Diligence will not tell you whether a commercial team is capable of executing a plan it has never been asked to execute. Nobody can test that from the outside, and attempting to is how commercial team diligence turns into an assessment exercise that produces opinions rather than facts.

What it does settle is the dependency map: who produces, who holds, what pays, and what the business would still have if any individual stopped turning up. That is enough to write a first-year plan that is not quietly resting on three people nobody wrote down.

What is commercial team diligence?

It is the pre-close examination of how revenue is actually produced in a target at the level of named individuals: who originates opportunities, who holds the customer relationships, what the incentive plan pays for, and what would remain if specific people left. It differs from management assessment, which evaluates capability, and from pipeline data diligence, which tests whether the reported numbers are accurate.

How is this different from standard management due diligence?

Standard management due diligence looks at the leadership team, usually through interviews, references and an assessment framework, and asks whether they are the right people. Commercial team diligence asks a narrower question that produces harder facts: where does the revenue come from, person by person. The two findings often point at different individuals, because the people who hold revenue relationships are not always the people with senior titles.

What should a buyer ask a target for to test this?

The comp plan documents and two years of actual payouts by person, account-level revenue for the trailing period with the owner and the closer named, and access to trace a sample of top accounts back to how the relationship started. Most of this exists already. The origination history usually has to be reconstructed in conversation rather than exported, which is why a traced sample beats a full list.

Does a key-person finding reduce the price?

Rarely on its own. Sellers answer people findings with retention mechanics such as stay bonuses, earnouts and employment agreements rather than a discount, so the finding tends to move deal structure instead. It is more valuable as an input to the first-year plan and budget, where the cost of building a demand source that does not depend on those individuals can be stated and funded.

What if the target’s CRM cannot support these tests?

That is itself a finding, and it changes the order of work rather than stopping it. Origination can be reconstructed from invoices, account histories and conversations with the people involved, which is slower but does not depend on the system being good. The condition of the data is tested separately, and a buyer should not treat a clean-looking CRM as evidence that the underlying relationships are institutional.

Have a revenue problem the board is asking about? Start a conversation.

Have a growth problem the board is asking about?

We invest to find your revenue leak. Then we stay to fix it.